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LOSING OUR RELIGION: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT PURSUANT
TO SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
There is a holy war being waged in this country. It is a war
being fought not with the sword, but with the pen, and at stake is
nothing less than one of the most sacred rights guaranteed by our
Constitution, the free exercise of religion.' For years, the Supreme
Court was the main source of guidance for interpreting the Free
Exercise Clause. In 1963, in Sherbert v. Verner/ a case involving
the denial of unemployment benefits to a person who refused to
work on Saturday because of her religious beliefs, the Court held
that any substantial burden to an individual's religious exercise had
to be justified by a compelling state interest. After Sherbert, the
compelling interest test applied to generally applicable laws that
had the incidental effect of burdening religious exercise. With
Sherbert, the judicial branch undertook to oversee and protect
religious freedom, guaranteeing that religious freedom would be
protected by the highest constitutional standard. It was unnecessary,
and would have been superfluous, for Congress to act with respect
to protecting religious freedom. Congress never acted, therefore,
and the First Amendment's sacred guarantee appeared safe. Almost
thirty years after Sherbert was decided, however, in a decision that
dealt a devastating blow to religious freedom, the Supreme Court
destroyed the substance of the Free Exercise Clause.
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith,3 the Supreme Court overruled Sherbert and the
long line of cases that followed its rule. The Court upheld the con-
' The right to the free exercise of religion is guaranteed under the Free Exercise
Clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. I ('Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .
2 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
3 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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stitutionality of an Oregon law that criminalized the use of peyote4
and had the "incidental" effect of depriving two Native American
workers of unemployment benefits because of their religious use of
small quantities of the drug.5 In addition, although the issue was
not addressed by the parties, the Court held sua sponte that the
Sherbert compelling interest test no longer applied to a neutral law
of general applicability even if the effect of the law was to burden
one's religious exercise.' In so holding, the Court struck down the
requirement that government justify laws facially neutral towards
religion that have the incidental effect of substantially burdening
religious freedom by a compelling state interest. Further diluting the
Sherbert line of cases, the Court did not even require that an inci-
dental burden to religious freedom meet an intermediate scrutiny
test, a lesser, but still heightened, standard of constitutional protec-
tion. Rather, after Smith, the Court would uphold any generally
applicable law that had an incidental burden on religious freedom
as long as the Court was satisfied that the law was a rational means
of protecting a legitimate government objective
The Smith decision was vehemently criticized by impassioned
commentators.8 However, no reaction to the decision was more
I Peyote was described as "that plant of the genus Lophophora commonly known as
peyote [having narcotic properties]" under OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(5) (1997).
5 494 U.S. at 874.
6 Id. at 884-85.
7 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.
27, 28 (1990) (statement of Rev. Dean M. Kelley, Counselor on Religious Liberty, Na-
tional Council of Churches) ([Protection of religious freedom] wasn't demoted just to the
next lower or intermediate stage of requiring an important State interest to trump it, but
demoted all the way down to the level of those interests that are not protected by the
Bill of Rights where the Government need show only a rational means to protect the
legitimate end of govemment.").
8 See, e.g., Robert A. Destro, "By What Right?': The Sources and Limits of Federal
Court and Congressional Jurisdiction Over Matters "Touching Religion," 29 IND. L. REV.
1, 4 (1995) ("Almost immediately, it became an article of faith among most advocates of
religious liberty that Smith was wrongly decided and that the rule announced in the
case should not be followed.") (citing Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious
Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 149, 231-33 (1991) (stating that
the Smith decision resulted in "the virtual abandonment of the Free Exercise Clause,"
"reach[ing] a low point in modem constitutional protection under the Free Exercise
Clause," and "leav[ing] the Free Exercise Clause without independent constitutional con-
tent and thus, for practical purposes, largely meaningless"); Wendy S. Whitbeck, Note,
Restoring Rites and Rejecting Wrongs: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 18 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 821, 821-22 (1994) (stating that the Smith decision had "been variously
described as an embarrassment, a sweeping disaster for religious liberty, and a dastardly
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impacting than that of Congress, which immediately undertook to
remedy the situation. The first bill in response to Smith was intro-
duced soon after the case was decided.' Several versions later,
Congress agreed on the correct response when, in 1993, it passed
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"),10 a law that had
and unprovoked attack on our first [amendment] freedom.") (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
I In 1990, Rep. Stephen Solarz introduced the first version of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.
10 Relevant sections of RFRA are set forth in full below:
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. Congressional findings and declaration of purposes
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that:
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an
unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Consti-
tution;
(2) laws "neutral' toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as
laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme
Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the govemment justify burdens
on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral towards religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and com-
peting prior governmental interests.
(b) Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are:
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Vemer,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is sub-
stantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by government.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. Free exercise of religion protected
(a) In general
Govemment shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Govemment may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person:
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling govemmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
(c) Judicial relief
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this sec-
tion may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding
and obtain appropriate relief against a govemment. Standing to assert a claim
1998]
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the express purpose "to restore the compelling interest test... and
to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of reli-
gion is substantially burdened."11 Under RFRA, the compelling in-
terest test again applied to generally applicable laws that had the
incidental effect of burdening religious freedom.
As decisive as Congress' reaction to Smith appeared to be, so
too was the reaction of the Supreme Court to the passage of RFRA.
In City of Boerne v. Flores,2 the Court struck down the statute.
Once again, the Supreme Court effectively removed the highest
standard of constitutional protection from one of the most important
freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.
Part I of this comment provides a recent history of free exercise
jurisprudence, focusing on the Sherbert and Smith decisions and
Congress' enactment of RFRA. Part II discusses Boerne and the facts
that gave rise to the decision. Part III analyzes the Supreme Court's
decision in Boerne and suggests an alternative approach to deter-
mining the reach of Congress' power to enact RFRA. This Part ar-
gues that Congress' remedial power to expand constitutional rights,
the separation of powers doctrine and the Supreme Court's self-
imposed principle of judicial restraint caution against limiting
Congress' power to enact RFRA under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 3 Where Congress has exercised its legislative powers
and determined that protection is needed for a constitutional right
and the Court has refused to provide that protection, Congress
should have the power to act accordingly.
I. A RECENT HISTORY OF FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Sherbert v. Verner and the Effect of the Compelling Interest Test
on the Free Exercise Clause
Sherbert v. Verner"4 marked the first time that the Supreme
Court applied the compelling interest test to a Free Exercise Clause
challenge to a generally applicable law. The Court held that the
or defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of stand-
ing under article IH of the Constitution.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb, 2000bb-1 (1994).
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994).
12 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
14 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act,' a law facially
neutral towards religion, was nonetheless unconstitutional because
it had the incidental effect of denying unemployment benefits to a
person who refused to work on a Saturday because of her religious
beliefs." The challenged law conditioned a person's receipt of
unemployment benefits on being "able to work and [being] avail-
able for work." 7 Further, the law stated that a person is ineligible
for benefits "[i]f the Commission finds that he has failed, without
good cause .. to accept available suitable work when offered to
him by the employment office or an employer .... 8 The South
Carolina Employment Security Commission found that the
claimant's refusal to work on Saturday because of her religious
beliefs did not constitute "good cause."' 9 The decision of the
Commission was upheld by the South Carolina Supreme Court.2"
The case reached the United States Supreme Court where
Justice Brennan, delivering the majority opinion, firmly stated at the
outset of his decision, that
[t]he door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any
governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.... Government
may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief; nor penalize or
discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious
views abhorrent to the authorities; nor employ the taxing power to inhibit
the dissemination of particular religious views.21
In analyzing the constitutionality of the South Carolina law, the
Court stated that if the law was to survive appellant's challenge, "it
must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary repre-
sents no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free
exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of
appellant's religion may be justified by a 'compelling state interest
s S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-120 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
1' 374 U.S. at 399. The appellant in the case was a member of the Seventh-day
Adventist Church and was discharged by her employer because she would not work on
Saturday, the holy day of her faith. She was unable to obtain further employment be-
cause she refused to take Saturday work.
17 S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-120(3).
'B S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-120(3).
19 374 U.S. at 401.
-o Sherbert v. Vemer, 125 S.E.2d 737, 746 (S.C. 1962), rev'd 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(holding that the claimant's religious liberties were not unconstitutionally infringed upon
because the statute "places no restriction upon the appellant's freedom of religion nor
does it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her right and freedom to observe her
religious beliefs in accordance with the dictates of her conscience.").
21 374 U.S. at 402 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
19981
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power
to regulate."' 22 The Court found that the South Carolina law did
infringe on appellant's free exercise rights because it "forces her to
choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting
benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of
her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand."23 The
Court stated that "[g]overnmental imposition of such a choice puts
the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would
a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship."24
Considering the question of whether some compelling state
interest justified the burden imposed on appellant, the Court stated
that, "[i]t is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship
to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensi-
tive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.' 25
The State claimed that there was a possibility that the filing of fraud-
ulent claims by merchants claiming religious objection to Saturday
work might dilute the unemployment compensation fund and hin-
der the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work.26
The Court rejected this contention as a viable justification for
infringing on appellant's First Amendment rights.27
For the next twenty-seven years, the Sherbert compelling inter-
est test proved to be "a workable test for striking sensible balances
between religious liberty and competing prior governmental inter-
ests."28 It gave substance to the Free Exercise Clause. It allowed
courts to weigh competing interests and determine the importance
of such interests; but it did not render all laws invalid. Courts were
able to recognize laws that were of such great importance that even
First Amendment rights had to be compromised.
22 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
23 374 U.S. at 404.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
26 374 U.S. at 407.
27 Id. The Court held that it did not have to consider the state's claim because it
was not raised in the courts below. The Court further stated, however, that if such a
claim had been an issue on appeal, "it is highly doubtful whether such evidence [of
false claims] would be sufficient to warrant a substantial infringement of religious liber-
ties. For even if the possibility of spurious claims did threaten to dilute the fund and
disrupt the scheduling of work, it would plainly be incumbent upon the appellees to
demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without
infringing First Amendment rights." Id.
28 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (1994).
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1. Cases In Which The Supreme Court Upheld Laws
Challenged On Free Exercise Grounds
The Supreme Court, on several occasions, has upheld, in the
face of free exercise challenges, the constitutionality of laws that
involve maintenance of the military. In Gillette v. United States,29
the Court heard two cases in which individuals claimed, among
other things, that Congress interfered with their free exercise rights
by conscripting them for the Vietnam War, which they claimed to
oppose on religious grounds. The Court analyzed the relevant stat-
ute under the compelling interest test and determined that any
incidental burden to a person's religious beliefs was far outweighed
by the government's substantial interest in procuring the manpower
necessary to sustain the military.3"
In a similar case, Johnson v. Robison,31 the Court analyzed
certain portions of the Veterans Readjustment Benefits Act of
1966,32 an act that allegedly violated the petitioner's free exercise
rights. The religion-neutral statute had the incidental effect of deny-
ing the petitioner educational benefits under the Act because he
was a conscientious objector who completed two years of alterna-
tive civilian service instead of serving on full-time active duty in the
Armed Forces.33 Relying on Gillette, the Court upheld the statute,
once again recognizing that "the Government's substantial interest
in raising and supporting armies, is of 'a kind and weight' clearly
sufficient to sustain the challenged legislation"34 against an attack
based on the petitioner's free exercise rights.
The Court has also found a compelling governmental interest
for certain tax laws that were attacked on free exercise grounds. In
United States v. Lee,35 a member of the Old Order Amish failed to
file the necessary quarterly Social Security tax returns required of
employers and refused to withhold Social Security tax from his em-
ployees or pay the employer's share of Social Security taxes, on the
grounds that the imposition of Social Security taxes violated his free
exercise rights and those of his Amish employees.36 The Court first
401 U.S. 437 (1971).
30 Id. at 462.
3' 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
32 38 U.S.C. §§ 101(21), 1652(a)(1) and 1661(a) (1994).
3 415 U.S. at 362-63.
3 Id. at 385.
3' 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
36 Id. at 254-55. The Court noted that the district court accepted the contention that
1998]
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determined that subjecting the Amish to compulsory participation in
the Social Security system clearly interfered with their free exercise
rights. 7 Nevertheless, the Court upheld the law as it applied to the
Amish, determining that the governmental interest in maintaining a
sound nationwide tax system outweighed the rights of the Amish to
be free from compliance with the law. 8 The Court, recognizing
that the compelling interest test does not render all statutes per se
unconstitutional, stated that "Congress and the courts have been
sensitive to the needs flowing from the Free Exercise Clause, but
every person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to
exercising every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs."39
In Bob Jones University v. United States,4" a case raising simi-
lar issues to those raised in Lee, the Court held that tax-exempt
status provided to private religious schools by the Internal Revenue
Code could be denied to schools that discriminated in their admis-
sions policies on the basis of race. Several schools challenged the
policy of the IRS, arguing that if tax-exempt status could be granted
to non-religious private schools, it could not constitutionally be
denied to religious schools that practice racial discrimination "on
the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs."41 The governmental
interest was clear: "[TIhe Government has a fundamental, overriding
interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education-discrimi-
nation that prevailed, with official approval, for the first 165 years
of this Nation's constitutional history."42 Such interest unquestion-
ably outweighed whatever burden the denial of tax exempt status
placed on the schools' ability to exercise their religious beliefs. 3
the Amish believe it is sinful not to provide for their own elderly and needy and are
therefore religiously opposed to the national Social Security system. Id. at 255. The Su-
preme Court further accepted the contention that the Amish religion bars contribution to
that system. Id.
37 455 U.S. at 257.
Id. at 260.
19 Id. at 261.
40 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
41 Id. at 602.
42 Id. at 604.
43 Id.
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2. Cases In Which The Court Struck Down Laws On Free
Exercise Grounds
Generally applicable laws that had the incidental effect of
burdening one's religious exercise did not always survive under the
Sherbert test. In Wisconsin v. Yoder," the Court held that
Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law did not apply to
Amish parents who claimed that sending their children to school
after the eighth grade violated an essential part of their religious be-
liefs and practices. The State argued that its interest in its system of
compulsory education was so compelling that it outweighed the
established practices of the Amish.45 After accepting the sincerity
of the Amish parents' religious beliefs and the validity of the State's
interests in compulsory education, the Court held that the latter did
not substantially outweigh the former.46
In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Securi-
ty Division,47 the Court had to consider whether the State's denial
of unemployment compensation benefits to a Jehovah's Witness
who terminated his own employment because his religious beliefs
forbade him from participating in the production of armaments was
a violation of his free exercise rights. The State attempted to justify
the denial of benefits by urging that the Indiana unemployment
compensation scheme served: (1) to prevent widespread unemploy-
ment and the consequent burden on the unemployment fund if
people were allowed to leave jobs for personal reasons; and (2) to
prevent employers from having to engage in a detailed probing of
an employee's religious beliefs. 8 Neither of these proposed inter-
ests was accepted by the Court as compelling justifications for
burdening religious freedom.49
In yet another case involving unemployment insurance, Hobbie
v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida,"0 the Court
held that a Florida law did not apply to an individual who was
forced to cease her employment after becoming baptized into the
Seventh-day Adventist Church. She informed her employer that,
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
45 Id. at 221.
46 Id. at 234.
4' 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
4a Id. at 718-19.
41 Id. at 719.
'0 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
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after the baptism, she would no longer be able to work from sun-
down Friday to sundown Saturday. It was undisputed that working
during these hours was in direct conflict with Hobbie's sincerely
held religious beliefs."' The Florida Unemployment Appeals
Commission denied Hobbie benefits, finding that her refusal to
work the specified hours constituted "misconduct" which disquali-
fied her from the receipt of benefits.52 The Court first rejected the
Appeals Commission's argument that it should be subject to a test
less strict than the compelling interest test because Hobbie was a
convert whose sincerely held religious beliefs arose after she started
employment. 3 The Court then went on to conclude that Florida's
refusal to award Hobbie unemployment compensation benefits
violated the Free Exercise Clause. 4
For twenty-seven years the compelling interest test first enunci-
ated in Sherbert served to protect one of the core rights guaranteed
by the Constitution. Applying a lower level of constitutional protec-
tion to the Free Exercise Clause was expressly rejected by a majority
of the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Roy,"5 where Justice O'Connor
stated that "[s]uch a test has no basis in precedent and relegates a
serious First Amendment value to the barest level of minimal scruti-
ny that the Equal Protection Clause already provides." 6 It was not
long after Bowen, however, that the Supreme Court abandoned this
notion.
B. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith and The End of Heightened Constitutional
Protection
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, 7 members of the Native American Church chal-
lenged, on Free Exercise grounds, an Oregon statute"5 of general
applicability that made the use of peyote criminal.59 Two members
52 Id. at 138.
12 Id. at 138-39.
11 Id. at 143-44.
4 Id. at 146.
s 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
56 Id. at 727 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
s ORE. REv. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987).
s The Oregon law in question prohibited "the knowing or intentional possession of
a controlled substance," ORE. REv. STAT. § 475.992(4), and defined controlled sub-
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of the Native American Church were denied unemployment benefits
by the Employment Division when they lost their jobs because they
had used peyote as part of their religious practices.6" The two men
appealed the decision. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the
determination of the Employment Division, holding that the denial
of unemployment benefits violated the free exercise rights of the
two men.61  The Oregon Supreme Court, relying on Sherbert,
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.62
The United States Supreme Court obtained the case and had
the opportunity to scrutinize Oregon's statute under the compelling
interest test set forth in Sherbert. Under the Sherbert test, the Court
would have asked whether Oregon's statute substantially burdened
a religious practice and, if so, whether there was a compelling
governmental interest justifying the law. However, the Court never
reached that question. Despite the fact that the Court had before it a
workable test for analyzing a statute that burdened the free exercise
of the petitioners' religion, the Court refused to apply that test in
Smith.63 As the Court later explained in Boerne, "[tihe application
of the Sherbert test ... would have produced an anomaly in the
law, a constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general applica-
stance' as a drug classified in Schedules I through V of the Federal Controlled Substanc-
es Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-812, as modified by the State Board of Pharmacy. ORE. REV.
STAT. § 475.005(6). Schedule I contains the drug peyote. Persons who are in violation
of the statute by possessing peyote are 'guilty of a Class B felony.' ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 475.992(4)(a).
60 494 U.S. at 874.
61 Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon, 709 P.2d 246
(Or. Ct. App. 1985) and Black v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Ore-
gon, 707 P.2d 1274 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
62 Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon, 721 P.2d 445
(Or. 1986).
6 The Court stated:
The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially
harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy,
'cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a reli-
gious objector's spiritual development.' To make an individual's obligation to
obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious
beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling' . contradicts both
constitutional tradition and common sense.




bility. The anomaly would have been accentuated.., by the diffi-
culty of determining whether a particular practice was central to an
individual's religion."64
The Court noted that in other instances where it struck down
laws that violated the Free Exercise Clause, it did so because such
laws violated other laws in conjunction with the Free Exercise
Clause.6' The Court felt that, unless a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause is also a violation of some other federally protected right,
then no constitutional violation exists. 66 The Court explicitly reject-
ed the compelling interest test as it applied to free exercise chal-
lenges to generally applicable laws, stating that "[tihe 'compelling
government interest' requirement seems benign, because it is famil-
iar from other fields. But using it as the standard that must be met
before the government may accord different treatment on the basis
of race, or before the government may regulate the content of
speech, is not remotely comparable to using it for the purposes
asserted here."67 Thus, after Smith, generally applicable laws could
burden religious practices even when not supported by a
compelling governmental interest.
The effects of Smith on the Free Exercise Clause were immedi-
ately felt. In decision after decision, lower courts were forced to
apply a new standard of scrutiny that virtually eliminated any pro-
tection previously provided by the Free Exercise Clause. Conceded-
ly, several of these laws likely would have been upheld even under
City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2161 (1997). "
61 494 U.S. at 881 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Follett v.
McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925)).
6 494 U.S. at 882. The Court stated
Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when otherwise prohibitable
conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions but
the conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation. We have never
held that, and decline to do so now. There being no contention that Oregon's
drug law represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the communication
of religious beliefs, or the raising of one's children in those beliefs, the rule to
which we have adhered ever since Reynolds [v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1879) (rejecting the claim that criminal laws against polygamy could not be
constitutionally applied to those whose religion commanded the practice)]
plainly controls.
Id.
67 Id. at 885-86 (citations omitted).
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strict scrutiny.68 What Smith accomplished was to also require
courts to uphold those laws that burden religious freedom where no
compelling state interest exists.
C. Free Exercise Jurisprudence after Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith
In Intercommunity Center for Justice and Peace v. INS,69 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to determine whether
the Intercommunity Center for Justice and Peace, an organization of
forty-one Roman Catholic orders and six individual Roman Catholic
nuns, was exempt from the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
198670 on the ground that enforcement of the Act violated the Free
Exercise Clause. 71 The main purpose of the Act is to deter illegal
immigration by sanctioning employers who engage in the practice
of employing illegal immigrants. Pursuant to that goal, the Act im-
poses several requirements on employers with respect to its em-
ployees72 and authorizes the imposition of civil fines if an employ-
er violates the requirements73 or, in some cases, criminal punish-
ment.74 Plaintiffs alleged that they employed people without regard
to immigrant status as part of their religious ministries and in accor-
dance with the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. 75 The
court, after accepting as true the allegation that plaintiffs' religious
beliefs were sincere,' noted that the law being challenged was a
neutral law of general application and therefore, "[n]o free exercise
claim exists under such circumstances." 77 The court went on to
announce, however, that "even without the decision in Smith, strict
scrutiny would neither be warranted, nor alter the result" in the
" See, e.g., Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992) (holding that no
federal cause of action existed where petitioner challenged, on free exercise grounds, the
constitutionality of the Maine Drug Paraphernalia Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A § 1111-
A (West 1983), but under the Maine Constitution, the statute was still justified by a
compelling governmental interest).
6' 910 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1990). See also American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v.
Thomburgh, 941 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1991).
70 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1994 & Supp. If 1995-1997).
11 910 F.2d at 43.
72 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b).
See id. § 1324a(e).
See id. § 1324a(f).
71 910 F.2d at 43.
76 Id. at 44.
77 Id. at 44.
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case.78 It analogized Congress' interest in controlling the flow of
aliens to its interest in a uniform tax system and, therefore, stated
that the government's interest would have survived the compelling
interest test.79
Another decision following Smith that likely would have result-
ed in the same outcome under the compelling interest test is State
v. Flesher.8" In Flesher, the petitioner sought a religious exemption
for the use of marijuana.8 The court, citing Smith, playfully held
that the case "reduces appellant's arguments to a puff of smoke,"82
without even considering the merits of appellant's claim. Although
the court did not theorize as to how the case might have been
decided under the compelling interest test, it is likely that the same
result would follow. Other courts have relied on sources other than
Smith in holding that laws regulating drugs survive the compelling
interest test when challenged on free exercise grounds.83
Still, other decisions demonstrate the devastating effect that
Smith had on free exercise jurisprudence. In Montgomery v. County
of Clinton, 4 a Jewish woman claimed that the performance of an
autopsy without her consent on her deceased child violated the reli-
gious tenets of Judaism." The court assumed that the performance
of the autopsy impinged upon her religious freedom. It noted,
however, that the law under which the autopsy was performed was
generally applicable and religion-neutral and that the defendants'
actions were reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
objective. 7
In a similar case, Yang v. Sturner,88 the court was faced with a
regrettable situation in which Smith proved dispositive. Earlier in
the same year that Sturner was decided, the court had issued an
78 Id. at 45-6 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 46. See supra text accompanying notes 35-43.
'o 585 N.E.2d 901 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
8' Id. at 902.
82 Id. at 903.
'3 See, e.g., Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63, 65-68 (Me. 1992) (applying
the Maine Constitution's Free Exercise Clause which mandates that a statute that burdens
a sincerely held religious belief be justified by a compelling state interest and holding
that: (1) Maine met that burden where its interest was to prevent the distribution and
use of illegal drugs and (2) under Smith, no federal cause of action existed).
743 F. Supp. 1253 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
85 Id. at 1257-58.
Id. at 1259.
87 Id.
750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990).
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opinion granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs for damages re-
sulting from the defendant's violation of their First Amendment
rights.89 The dispute arose out of an autopsy conducted by the
defendant on the plaintiffs' son. The plaintiffs are Hmongs and
believe that autopsies are a mutilation of the body.90 While the
court was researching the damages issue, Smith was decided. In
response to the altered state of free exercise jurisprudence, the court
concluded that it was obligated to recall its previous opinion." For
what it was worth, the court did not change its decision quietly.
Expressing the sentiment felt by many who recognized the effects
Smith would have on the Free Exercise Clause, the court expressed
its "profound regret,"92 and offered its support for the Smith
dissent.93
The case of United States v. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the
Religious Society of Friends94 involved the refusal of a religious
society to pay certain taxes demanded by an IRS Notice of Levy on
the grounds that the central tenets of the Society's employees' reli-
gious beliefs prohibited them from paying the military portion of
their taxes. Of course, after Smith, the court had no choice but to
dismiss the action. 9 The court did not do so without objection,
however, and instead expressed clear dissatisfaction with Smith
stating that:
It is ironic that here in Pennsylvania, the woods to which Penn led the
Religious Society of Friends to enjoy the blessings of religious liberty,
neither the Constitution nor its Bill of Rights protects the policy of that
Society not to coerce or violate the consciences of its employees and
members with respect to their religious principles, or to act as an agent
for our government in doing so. More than three hundred years after their
founding of Philadelphia, and almost two hundred years after the adop-
tion of the First Amendment, it would be a 'constitutional anomaly" to
the Supreme Court, if the Religious Society of Friends were allowed to
respect decisions of its employee-members bearing witness to their
faith.96
19 Yang v. Stumer, 728 F. Supp. 845 (D.R.I. 1990).
90 750 F. Supp. at 558.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 559.
9' Id. at 559-60.
9 753 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
9s Id. at 1304.
9 Id. at 1306 (internal citation omitted).
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D. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Backed by overwhelming support in both houses 7 and with
the support of a broad spectrum of groups representing various reli-
gions in this country,98 Congress enacted RFRA. Congress did not
hide the fact that it enacted RFRA as a direct response to Smith.
Congress unequivocally disagreed with the Court's decision in
Smith, finding that the decision was harmful to religious freedom.99
As clear as Congress' disagreement with Smith seemed to be, so too
was Congress' intent to correct what it saw as a terrible mistake.
Congress described its reasons for favoring the Sherbert compelling
interest test, stating that:
Though laws directly targeting religious practices have become increasing-
ly rare, facially neutral laws of general applicability have nefariously
burdened the free exercise of religion in the United States throughout
American history. Such laws, often upheld by the courts, undermined the
exercise of religion by various groups. Not until the Supreme Court used
the compelling governmental interest test in the free exercise context did
decisions more protective of religious liberty evolve.'"
Thus, Congress passed RFRA to restore the compelling interest
test set forth in Sherbert as it applied to free exercise challeng-
es."' I RFRA mandated that "[glovernment shall not substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results
"' The House of Representatives voted unanimously to enact RFRA while the Senate
passed the statute by a vote of 97-3.
1 Many groups filed amicus briefs both in favor of RFRA and against its constitution-
ality. The most striking and revealing group that filed an amicus brief in favor of RFRA,
however, is The Coalition For The Free Exercise of Religion. The Coalition, formed in
response to Smith, is a group of over 60 religious and civil liberties organizations repre-
senting a broad spectrum of religious faiths in America, including Christians, Jews, Mos-
lems, Native Americans and Sikhs. Also represented are religious liberals and conserva-
tives, and groups as varied as People for the American Way and Concerned Women for
America. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Coalition For The Free Exercise of Religion In
Support of Respondents, Interest of the Amici, at page 1 (1997).
99 H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 9-10 (1993):
The effect of the Smith decision has been to subject religious practices forbid-
den by laws of general applicability to the lowest level of scrutiny employed
by the courts. Because the "rational relationship test' only requires that a law
must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest, the Smith decision has
created a climate in which the free exercise of religion is continually in jeop-
ardy; facially neutral and generally applicable laws have and will, unless the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is passed, continue to burden religion.
Id.
10 H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 3.
'o' See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994).
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from a rule of general applicability"" 2 unless the government
demonstrates that the burden "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of fur-
thering that compelling governmental interest."'0 3 With RFRA,
Congress codified the strict scrutiny standard and applied it to the
Free Exercise Clause.
The right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the
Constitution in the First Amendment was once again raised to the
heightened standard to which the most important constitutional
guarantees were subject. No longer would laws of general applica-
bility which had the incidental effect of burdening religious freedom
be upheld because they survived a test of mere rationality. Barely
before the ink was dry on RFRA, however, the Supreme Court
struck it down in City of Boerne v. Flores.
II. CITY OF BOERNE v. FLORES
A. The Facts
Standing alone on a hill in the city of Boerne, Texas, is
St. Peter Catholic Church.' The church, built in 1923, seats ap-
proximately 230 worshippers. 5 However, the number of parish-
ioners has grown over the years, and because of the physical size of
the church, some forty to sixty parishioners could not attend Sunday
Mass." 6 In 1991, the church sought permission from the
Archbishop of San Antonio to enlarge its facility. 7 The church re-
ceived authorization from San Antonio Archbishop Flores to expand
the facility to accommodate its growing numbers.'
Several months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordi-
nance enacted to "'protect, enhance and perpetuate selected historic
landmarks' and to 'safeguard the City's historic and cultural heri-
tage."" 0 9  Under the ordinance, the city's Historic Landmark
Commission was authorized to prepare a preservation plan with
102 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).
103 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(1), (2).








proposed historic districts.'10 The City Council approved one of
the historic districts the Commission proposed, which included
within the district a part of St. Peter Church." 1 Although the his-
toric district included only the facade of the church, and although
the church itself was not considered a historic landmark, the city
considered the entire structure to be within the historic district." 2
In 1993, Archbishop Flores, as required by the city ordinance,
applied to the city for a building permit to enlarge the structure of
St. Peter Church."' He claimed that the structural renovations
would in no way affect the facade of the church which fell within
the historic district." 4  Nonetheless, the Historic Landmark
Commission denied the permit application, and the City Council
denied the church's appeal."' Archbishop Flores, on behalf of the
church, filed suit seeking a judicial declaration that the ordinance
was unconstitutional and violated RFRA.
Although the original complaint contained various claims, the
litigation focused on the constitutionality of RFRA. The district court
declared the statute unconstitutional, finding that Congress lacked
enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to enact RFRA and that the statute violated separation of powers
principles.'16 The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be consti-
tutional pursuant to Congress' broad enforcement power under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 7 The Supreme Court




11 73 F.3d at 1354.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 See Flores v. City of Boeme, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
"' See Flores v. City of Boeme, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996).
", In a 6-3 decision, Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion. He was joined
in all parts, except Part Ill-A-l, by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Thomas
and Ginsburg. Justice Scalia joined in all but Part Ill-A-1 and also filed a separate con-
curring opinion to refute the opinions set forth in justice O'Connor's dissent. Justice
Stevens filed a concurring opinion claiming that RFRA violated the Establishment Clause.
Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Breyer joined, except as to
a portion of Part I. Justice O'Connor urged the Court to reconsider its decision in the
Smith case. Justices Souter and Breyer filed dissenting opinions.
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B. The Decisions of the Supreme Court
1. The Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, began his analysis by
noting that section 5 is "a positive grant of legislative power."'
19
He stated that "[I]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional
violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement pow-
er even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself
unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy
previously reserved to the States."" 2 For example, in order to
combat racial discrimination, Congress has been given a great deal
of latitude in enacting legislation intended to guarantee voting
rights.' 2' The Court has consistently upheld legislation intended to
eliminate racial discrimination despite the burdens that the
legislation has placed on the States.'22
In the voting rights cases, the Court recognized that Congress'
power to stamp out racial discrimination is broad. However, the
Court also recognized that that power is not unlimited.'23 In deter-
mining whether that power extended to allow Congress to enact
RFRA, the Court began with the text of section 5. Justice Kennedy
acknowledged that, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in
Cantwell v. Connecticut,"24 in which the Court incorporated the
Free Exercise Clause into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress has the power to enact legislation under
section 5 enforcing the constitutional right to the free exercise of
119 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2163 (1997) (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651
(1966)).
120 Id. at 2163 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
121 The constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994),
and other legislation intended to protect the right of minorities to vote, were consistently
upheld against state challenges. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 466 U.S. 156,
161 (1980) (upholding seven year extension of the Voting Rights Act's requirement that
certain jurisdictions preclear any change to a "standard practice, or procedure with re-
spect to voting'); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding five year nation-
wide ban on literacy tests and similar voting requirements for registering to vote);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding ban on literacy tests that prohib-
ited certain people schooled in Puerto Rico from voting); South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding several provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
2 117 S. Ct. at 2163.
123 See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 128.
124 301 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
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religion.12 This power, Justice Kennedy said, is only remedial and
only extends to enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, not to legislation which alters the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause. 126 Further, although Justice Kennedy recognized
that Congress has wide latitude in determining where the line be-
tween remedial measures and measures affecting a substantive
change in the law may lie, he also warned that "the distinction
exists and must be observed. There must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end."127
Justice Kennedy's effort to determine where the distinction lies
began with the history of the Fourteenth Amendment. He set forth a
lengthy account of the history of the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, including reference to the original debates addressing
that amendment.128 By referring to the amendment's origins, he
sought to demonstrate the "remedial, rather than substantive, nature
of the Enforcement Clause."'29 To determine whether RFRA fit into
that definition of Congress' section 5 power, Justice Kennedy ad-
dressed the Court's previous cases dealing with that power. One of
the earliest instances where the Court addressed the remedial and
preventive nature of the Fourteenth Amendment was the Civil
Rights Cases, ' where the Court held that section 5 did not
authorize Congress to pass
general legislation upon the rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation,
that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such laws
as the States may adopt or enforce, and which, by the amendment, they
125 117 S. Ct. at 2163.
126 Id. at 2164. Justice Kennedy stated:
The design of the Amendment and the text of Section 5 are inconsistent with
the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the
Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters the
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the
Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the
right is. It has been given the power "to enforce," not the power to determine
what constitutes a constitutional violation.
Id.
127 Id. at 2164.
128 Id. at 2164-66.
1 9 Id. at 2164.
13o 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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are prohibited from making or enforcing, or such acts or proceedings as
the states may commit or take, and which, by the amendment, they are
prohibited from committing or taking. 3 '
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,'32 the. Court upheld various
provisions of the Voting Rights Act, justifying its holding by noting
that the provisions in question were "remedies aimed at areas
where voting discrimination has been most flagrant." '33 The Court
stated that the remedies were necessary to "banish the blight of
racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral
process in parts of our country for nearly a century."' 34 Justice
Kennedy justified the "unprecedented remedies"' 5 created by the
Voting Rights Act by pointing out the "ineffectiveness of the existing
voting rights laws"'36 and "the slow costly character of case-by-
case litigation."'37 Following South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the
Court continued to allow Congress broad discretion in enacting
legislation intended to "respond to the widespread and persisting
deprivation of constitutional rights resulting from this country's
history of racial discrimination."'38 Notwithstanding Congress'
broad discretion, Justice Kennedy stated that "[a]ny suggestion that
Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the
Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law."'39
Justice Kennedy then considered the issue central to the contro-
versy-whether RFRA can be considered enforcement legislation
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 4° Respondents
claimed that RFRA was a proper exercise of Congress' enforcement
power because, "[i]f Congress can prohibit laws with discriminatory
effects in order to prevent racial discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, then it can do the same ... to promote
religious liberty."' 4' Justice Kennedy disagreed, stating that
3I Id. at 13-14.
132 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
,31 Id. at 315.
, Id. at 308.
,3 City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2167 (1997).
'36 Id. at 2167 (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313-15).
137 Id. at 2167 (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328).
I" Id. at 2167 (citing City of Rome v. United States, 466 U.S. 156, 182 (1980); Ore-
gon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656
(1966)).
139 Id. at 2167.
140 117 S. Ct. at 2168.
141 Id. at 2169 (citations omitted).
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"[w]hile preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial mea-
sures, there must be a congruence between the means used and the
ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of remedial measures
must be considered in light of the evil presented."' 42 Thus, he
claimed that strong measures appropriate to remedy harms resulting
from racial discrimination may not be appropriate to address reli-
gious discrimination. 43 Justice Kennedy distinguished Congress'
power to enact the Voting Rights Act from its lack of power to enact
RFRA. While the record that confronted Congress when it enacted
the Voting Rights Act presumably contained recent examples of
racial discrimination, Justice Kennedy felt that "RFRA's legislative
record lacks examples of modern instances of generally applicable
laws passed because of religious bigotry .... Rather, the emphasis
of the hearings was on laws of general applicability which place
incidental burdens on religion."' 4 He believed that Congress'
concern with incidental burdens imposed on religion did not autho-
rize Congress to utilize its section 5 enforcement power as it did to
remedy racial discrimination.
However, this was not RFRA's "most serious shortcoming," 4s
according to Justice Kennedy. 46 Justice Kennedy believed RFRA
failed most severely because it could not be considered remedial or
preventive "if those terms are to have any meaning." 47 He stated
that RFRA was not narrow enough in scope to address the types of
problems against which the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to
protect. He described the statute as "so out of proportion to a sup-
posed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It
appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional
protections." 4 ' Justice Kennedy envisioned that under RFRA, any
law enacted by any level of government would be subject to free
142 Id. (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308).
143 Id. (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334).
144 Id.
117 S. Ct. at 2169.
,4 In fact, the Court recognized that it is entirely within the power of the legislative
branch to determine the method it will utilize to reach a decision. "Judicial deference,
in most cases, is based not on the state of the legislative record Congress compiles but
'on due regard for the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to decide.'" Id. at
2170 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207 (1970)).
"I Id. at 2170.
148 Id.
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exercise challenges.'49 Even in the voting rights cases, he noted,
Congress was more confined when it utilized its enforcement
power."' 0
Justice Kennedy believed that the compelling interest test was
too substantial an obstacle for states to overcome in attempting to
justify laws of general applicability.' He stated that the test is "a
considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional
prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and
welfare of their citizens.""5 2 He foresaw that RFRA would impose
"a heavy litigation burden on the States"'53 and would curtail their
"traditional general regulatory power,"5 4 stating that these bur-
dens "far exceed any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct
under the Free Exercise clause as interpreted in Smith."' Justice
Kennedy added:
[i]t is a reality of the modem regulatory state that numerous state laws...
impose a substantial burden on a large class of individuals. When the
exercise of religion has been burdened in an incidental way by a law of
general application, it does not follow that the persons affected have been
burdened any more than other citizens, let alone burdened because of
their religious beliefs."5 6
Justice Kennedy then briefly addressed the issue of whether
RFRA violated the separation of powers doctrine by intruding on the
role of the judiciary to "say what the law is."'"7 He stated that
where the Court has issued an interpretation of the Constitution,
settled principles, including stare decisis, dictate that the Court must
follow that decision and "contrary expectations must be disappoint-
ed.' s8 Congress violated this principle, he argued, because it
"9 Id. ('Sweeping coverage ensures [RFRA's] intrusion at every level of government,
displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless
of subject matter. . . . Any law is subject to challenge at any time by any individual
who alleges a substantial burden on his or her free exercise of religion.').
117 S. Ct. at 2170.
's' Id. at 2171 ('Claims that a law substantially burdens someone's exercise of reli-
gion will often be difficult to contest. Requiring a state to demonstrate a compelling
interest and show that it has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving that inter-
est is the most demanding test known to constitutional law.') (citations omitted).
"s2 Id. at 2171.
153 Id.
15 Id.
"' 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
156 Id.
"' Id. at 2172 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
158 Id.
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attempted to control cases and controversies through a statute that
was beyond congressional authority, and therefore, the Court's
precedent controlled. 59
2. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stevens, concurring in judgment, expressed the opinion
that RFRA violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
because it "provided the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist
or agnostic can obtain." 6 ' He argued that this governmental
preference for religion is forbidden by the First Amendment. 6'
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion primarily to respond
to Justice O'Connor's analysis of the history of religious liberty.
Justice Scalia disagreed with Justice O'Connor's view of that history.
He believed that the material Justice O'Connor relied on either shed
little light on the issue or was in fact more consistent with the Smith
112decision. 16
Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, urged the Court to reexamine
its decision in Smith, believing that the decision was wrong in light
of both the Court's precedent and the Nation's tradition of religious
liberty.'63 She devoted much of her dissent to an analysis of
religious liberty to support her claim that
the Free Exercise Clause is not simply an antidiscrimination principle that
protects only against those laws that single out religious practice for unfa-
vorable treatment .... Rather, the Clause is best understood as an affirma-
tive guarantee of the right to participate in religious practices and conduct
without impermissible governmental interference, even when such con-
duct conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law.1"
She urged the Court to reinstate the rule in place before Smith,
whereby government had to justify any substantial burden on
religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest. 65
159 Id
160 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 2172-76 (Scalia, J., concurring).
163 Id. at 2177 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
'64 Id. (citations omitted).
165 117 S. Ct. at 2178.
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Justice Souter wrote a brief dissent arguing that he doubted the
precedential value of the Smith case and its entitlement to adher-
ence. 166 He stated that without briefing and argument on the mer-
its of Smith, he could neither accept nor reject its rule.167 Justice
Souter suggested that the Boerne case be set down for reargument,
allowing the parties to reexamine the issue. 61
Justice Breyer also dissented in a brief opinion, agreeing with
Justice O'Connor's suggestion that Smith be fully briefed and recon-
sidered.169 He did not find that it was necessary to consider
whether, assuming Smith was correct, section 5 would authorize
Congress to enact RFRA.' 70
Ill. ANALYSIS
The Boerne decision marks the second time this decade that
the Supreme Court has actually limited the scope of protection of
the Free Exercise Clause. The Court decided that Congress was
powerless to restore that protection to the highest constitutional
standard after Smith rendered the Free Exercise Clause devoid of
substance. For reasons set forth below, the Court improperly restrict-
ed the power of Congress to perform its essential function by ignor-
ing Congress' power to expand constitutional rights and by intrud-
ing on Congress' unique fact-finding ability. In the process, the
Court ignored the principle of stare decisis by paying no heed to its
own precedent.
Section A of this Part will focus on Congress' power to expand
the scope of Constitutional rights. Section B will address the separa-
tion of powers doctrine and the principle of judicial restraint. Al-
though no separate section will address the principle of stare
decisis, the arguments in sections A and B are based primarily on
Supreme Court precedent, and therefore, the Court's failure to ad-
here to the principle of stare decisis is a pervasive theme throughout
sections A and B.
'6 Id. at 2186 (Souter, J., dissenting).
167 Id.
16 Id.
169 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170 117 S. Ct. at 2186.
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A. Congress' Power to Expand the Scope of Constitutional Rights
The history of the Fourteenth Amendment reveals that the
Supreme Court has gradually, but definitively, expanded Congress'
power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and
other provisions of the Constitution that have been incorporated
into the sphere of protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment via the Due Process Clause. 7' In McCulloch v.
Maryland,"" the Court relied on the Necessary and Proper
Clause 73 and announced what became the origin for Congress'
broad section 5 power: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu-
tional." 74  In Ex Parte Virginia,"' one of the earliest cases inter-
preting Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court relied on its interpretation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause first enunciated in McCulloch. The Court set forth what has
become the broad standard on which all subsequent exercises of
Congress' enforcement power have been based:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the ob-
jects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission
to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoy-
ment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the
laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within
the domain of Congressional power.176
Years later, in the voting rights cases, this view of Congress'
enforcement power continued to expand. The Court relied on
section 5 to justify the enactment of legislation which seemingly
redefined the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The most influ-
ential of the voting rights cases is Katzenbach v. Morgan." In
Morgan, the Court relied on section 5 to uphold the constitutional-
171 The Free Exercise Clause was incorporated in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940).
172 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
173 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
174 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
1 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
176 Id. at 345-46.
'7 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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ity of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act.'78 The Court explained
that the expansion of Congress' power under section 5 to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause does not depend on a judicial determi-
nation that the enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress
violated the Equal Protection Clause.'79 In justifying its decision to
allow for what seemed like an unprecedented expansion of con-
gressional power, the Court described the effect the Fourteenth
Amendment had on the balance of power to interpret the Constitu-
tion: "'It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged. Con-
gress is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legis-
lation. Some legislation is contemplated to make the amendments
fully effective."" 8 A requirement that the Court first decide that
the state law regulated by a federal law violated the Fourteenth
Amendment as a condition to finding the federal statute constitu-
tional would depreciate congressional resourcefulness and congres-
sional responsibility for implementing the Amendment.' The leg-
islative power cannot be confined to the "insignificant role" of in-
validating only those laws that the Court is prepared to adjudge
unconstitutional.'82 It is clear from Morgan, even in the way the
Court phrased the issue, that it was substantially expanding
Congress' enforcement power. Justice Brennan defined the question
before the Court: "Without regard to whether the judiciary would
find that the Equal Protection Clause itself nullifies New York's
English literacy requirement as so applied, could Congress prohibit
the enforcement of the state law by legislating under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment?"' 83 In answering that question in the affir-
mative, the Court reiterated that the broad interpretation of con-
gressional power first enunciated in McCulloch remained the cor-
rect standard to apply.'84 It remains the correct standard to apply
today.
1- 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1964).
179 384 U.S. at 648.
'8 Id. (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345) (emphasis added).
'8' 384 U.S. at 648.
'a Id. at 648-49.
'8 Id. at 649.
'8 Id. at 651.
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Under a theory known as the "one-way ratchet" theory,185
Congress may expand constitutional rights guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment but may not dilute such rights. The theory
is derived from Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Morgan,
where he stated:
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, § 5 does not grant Congress
power to exercise discretion in the other direction and to enact "statutes
so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this
Court." We emphasize that Congress' power under § 5 grants Congress
no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.'86
As an example, Justice Brennan stated that Congress could not
authorize the States to establish racially segregated systems of edu-
cation because such systems would not be enforcing the Equal
Protection Clause-such laws would be in direct violation of what
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits.'87 The broad holding in
Morgan might have been interpreted to mean that Congress may
take away constitutional rights in addition to granting them. This
was the concern expressed by Justice Harlan in his dissent.'88
However, it is clear that Brennan was aware of this possible inter-
pretation and was careful to limit the broad holding in Morgan to
allow Congress only to enforce constitutional rights and not to
dilute such rights.
Justice Brennan's theory is not only an abstract conceptualiza-
tion of what section 5 means. It is also a real and practical limit on
congressional power that guarantees that an increase in Congress'
power to expand the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment will not
result in a consequential destruction of the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. The dilution of constitutional rights was clearly not
contemplated by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Surely,
if it was intended that Congress could dilute constitutional rights in
addition to expanding them, the word "enforce" would not have
been used by the framers. Thus, Justice Harlan's concern in Morgan
that the case would be interpreted to mean that Congress could take
away constitutional rights is without basis. When the Court subse-
"' For a discussion of three separate defenses of the one-way ratchet theory, see
Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can
Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U.
PA. L. REv. 1029, 1062-69 (1993).
186 384 U.S. at 651 n.10 (quoting Harlan, J., dissenting).
187 See id.
1"8 Id. at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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quently had occasion to test the theory, it confirmed Justice
Brennan's interpretation and reiterated that Justice Harlan's concern
would not become a reality. 89
Justice Brennan's Morgan footnote stands for the proposition
that Congress may only expand the scope of constitutional rights.
Therefore, RFRA can be considered legislation that is within
Congress' power under section 5 only if Congress was not diluting
the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause by the enactment of RFRA.
In order to determine whether that was RFRA's result, it is necessary
to compare the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause before RFRA
was enacted with its meaning after the statute went into effect.
For almost thirty years prior to the enactment of RFRA, the Free
Exercise Clause protected people in the practice of their religious
beliefs whether the law being challenged was discriminatory on its
face or a neutral law that had the incidental effect of burdening
religious freedom. 9 When the Court decided Smith it drastically
altered the definition of the Free Exercise Clause. The Court con-
firmed the radical change to the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah 9 '
when Justice Kennedy casually'92 stated that, "[iun addressing the
constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, our cases
establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of
general applicability need not be justified by a compelling govern-
mental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening
a particular religious practice."' 93 After Smith, the Free Exercise
Clause was confined to protect people against laws that targeted
religious beliefs as such or infringed upon or restricted practices
,89 See, e.g., Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
190 See supra Section I-A.
191 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
192 The Court's statement is characterized here as "casual" because it suggested that
this had always been the law. In fact, when Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority
opinion in Hialeah, referred to "our cases," he was referring to only one case. He was
referring to Smith. However, as justice O'Connor recognized in her dissent in Boerne,
"Smith . . . is a recent decision. As such, it has not engendered the kind of reliance on
its continued application that would militate against overruling it." City of Boeme v.
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2177 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Souter expressed
a similar sentiment: "I have serious doubts about the precedential value of the Smith
rule and its entitlement to adherence." Id. at 2186 (Souter, J., dissenting).
193 508 U.S. at 531.
1998]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
because of their religious motivation. 194 It did not protect individu-
als whose religious freedom was substantially burdened by
generally applicable laws.
What RFRA accomplished was to expand the meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause beyond the boundaries to which it was con-
fined after Smith. In no way did Congress take away any constitu-
tional protection. In Justice Brennan's Morgan footnote, he explicitly
stated that Congress could not dilute equal protection and due
process decisions of the Supreme Court.195 Had RFRA accom-
plished this, then surely the statute would have been unconstitution-
al. Instead, Congress' enactment of RFRA fits squarely within the
type of action contemplated by Justice Brennan in Morgan. Justice
Brennan rejected the notion that the Court was confined to finding
a federal statute constitutional only if the Court had already deter-
mined that the state law it would invalidate was in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 96 Therefore, in Boerne, the Court was
not confined to finding RFRA constitutional only if it first deter-
mined that the laws that it would nullify violated the Free Exercise
Clause.
Justice Kennedy stated that legislation which altered the mean-
ing of the Free Exercise Clause could not be said to be enforcing
the Clause because Congress does not enforce a constitutional right
by changing what the right is.'97 This reasoning is inconsistent
with the notion that Congress may expand constitutional rights. By
protecting individuals in the practice of their religious beliefs against
harms that the Court has determined are not protected by the Free
Exercise Clause, Congress is merely expanding the reach of the
Clause. It is not redefining what the Clause means. The Free
Exercise Clause means that the government, state or federal, may
not prohibit the free exercise of religion. RFRA does not change that
meaning. It only increases the reach of the Clause so that more
protection is granted than that envisioned by the Court in Smith.
RFRA did not dilute the Free Exercise Clause in any way. Because
RFRA only expanded the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, it
was well within Congress' power under section 5 to enact the law.
194 Id. at 533.
199 See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
19 See supra text accompanying note 181.
197 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
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B. Separation of Powers and The Principle of Judicial Restraint
The claim that Congress has the power to expand the sphere of
protection of the Free Exercise Clause is based not only on a judi-
cial interpretation of what the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment means but also on historical and structural reasons
which support the contention that Congress should have such pow-
er. One such reason is based on the structure of government
established by the Constitution and the principle of judicial
restraint.
The United States Constitution divides power conferred upon
the federal government into "legislative Powers ... vested in a
Congress,"'98  "executive Power ... vested in a President,"'9 9
and "judicial Power ... vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."2" The Constitution does not explicitly attempt to define
how far these powers reach.20' Rather, "the Constitution's central
mechanism of separation of powers depends largely upon common
understandings of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to
executives, and to courts." 0 2 Each branch is expected to respect
the powers accorded to other branches and to carry out its own
duties so as not to intrude upon the business of the other branches.
The Separation of Powers doctrine is "violated where one branch
invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-
upon branch approves the encroachment."0 3
The Separation of Powers doctrine mandates that in some areas
of constitutional interpretation, the courts must defer to the deci-
sions of the legislative branch.2 "4 This concept of deference, often
described as a "presumption of constitutionality," "deference to
'9 U.S. CONsT., art. I, § 1.
19 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1.
20W U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
2I See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992).
202 Id. at 559-60.
' New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992).
t The same principle applies to the executive branch, but the focus here is on Con-




political branches," "judicial minimalism," or simply, "judicial re-
straint,""' is based on years of constitutional tradition"' that
continues to have relevance in the present day.
Judicial restraint is not a concept that stands alone as a consti-
tutional principle. It is often in conflict with other principles of
constitutional law. In Boerne, judicial restraint and Congress' en-
forcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
came into direct conflict. While the Court was required to deter-
mine whether RFRA was within the scope of Congress' enforcement
power, it should have approached this analysis with a presumption
of constitutionality." 7 It is Congress' unique ability to determine
the need for constitutional protection, especially against laws that
do not appear discriminatory on their face, that justifies this conclu-
sion. As a practical matter, Congress is better equipped than the
Supreme Court to conclude that laws that appear neutral towards
religion can in fact be extremely burdensome to religious freedom.
It is within Congress' power to enact a remedy in response to such
laws where the Court refuses to do so.
The history of section 5 jurisprudence reveals an abundance of
legislation enacted pursuant to Congress' section 5 power which the
Supreme Court, and other courts interpreting Supreme Court prece-
dent, have upheld as valid exercises of that power. In addition to
the many cases in which federal courts have upheld provisions of
the Voting Rights Act and other acts meant to protect the right of
minorities to vote," 8 various federal courts have upheld laws that
20. Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of
Boeme v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REv. 153, 185-86 (1997).
206 Id. at 185 (citing James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 143-52 (1893)).
o Professor McConnell notes that:
Courts are particularly likely to defer to the judgments of representative bodies
when there are no judicially manageable standards for decisionmaking, when
more vigorous judicial review would trench on the policymaking prerogatives
of democratic bodies, when constitutional questions turn on empirical or pre-
dictive judgments, when the motives of legislators are in question, and when
the constitutional text provides little guidance. Courts are less likely to defer to
legislative judgments when the question presented involves a clash of demo-
cratic authorities (such as a conflict between Congress and the President) or
when governmental action may infringe upon individual rights or burden the
interests of unrepresented minorities.
Id. at 186 (citations omitted).
I( See e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 466 U.S. 156 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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protect the civil rights of women who seek to obtain reproductive
health services," 9 that protect the civil rights of aged persons in
employment, 1 ' that award attorney's fees to plaintiffs in civil
rights cases,211 that protect women from discrimination due to
pregnancy,"2 and that protect civil rights on a broad
scale." 3 In each of these cases, the Court found that Congress was
justified in enacting remedial legislation pursuant to its section 5
enforcement power.
In determining that RFRA did not fit into the category of cases
in which Congress may act pursuant to its section 5 power, the
Court relied to an extent on a comparison between the legislative
history of RFRA and that of the Voting Rights Act.214 While the
record confronting Congress when it enacted the Voting Rights Act
presumably contained ample evidence to support a finding that
racial bigotry was prevalent, the Court found that RFRA's legislative
record lacked "examples of modern instances of generally appli-
cable laws passed because of religious bigotry."21s By engaging in
a comparison between RFRA and the Voting Rights Act, the Court
overstepped its bounds and, quite frankly, missed the point. It sat as
209 See Planned Parenthood Ass'n of S.E. Pa., Inc. v. Walton, 949 F. Supp. 290 (E.D.
Pa. 1996) (upholding the constitutionality of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act (-FACE"), 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994)); see also, United States v. McMillan, 946 F.
Supp. 1254, 1262 (S.D. Miss. 1995) ('Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empow-
ers Congress to enact FACE insomuch as this section gives Congress the power 'to en-
force, by appropriate legislation, the provisions' of the Fourteenth Amendment, including
the provisions dealing with liberty, equal protection, and the privileges or immunities of
citizens.").
2"0 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601 (7th Cir.
1982) (upholding the constitutionality of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994)).
211 See Corpus v. Estelle, 605 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1976), and recognizing that "Section 5 is the source of broad legislative authority to
define and carry out the provisions of the amendment, an authority plenary within the
terms of the constitutional grant .... [I]n Katzenbach, the Court welcomed congressional
assistance, based on Section 5, in shaping the contours of the sometimes elusive con-
cepts embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, the Court made it plain that
the judiciary should not lightly rebuff such Congressional attempts.") (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted); see also, Bond v. Stanton, 555 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977).
212 See Vineyard v. Hollister Elementary Sch. Dist., 64 F.R.D. 580 (N.D. Cal. 1974)
(upholding the constitutionality of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. 1995-1997)).
2 See Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969) (upholding the constitution-
ality of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 1995-1997)).




a legislative body and weighed the evidence presented to Congress
in an effort to determine whether Congress could have found that
religious bigotry resulted from generally applicable laws. This intru-
sion by the Court into Congress' role as a legislative and fact-finding
body is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine and the
principle of judicial restraint. It was Congress' role to analyze the
evidence before it. The members of Congress believed that laws
neutral towards religion were as dangerous to religious freedom as
laws that were intentionally discriminatory.1 6 This determination
was not arbitrary but was based on a wealth of evidence. Congress
is the only branch of the federal government capable of making
such an informed judgment. The process of determining whether
remedial legislation is needed to combat a particular harm often
involves an analysis of a great deal of evidence and data that the
Court is simply not able to evaluate.217 Congress, and not the
Court, is the branch responsible for enacting legislation, and to this
end, it is Congress that is better equipped to determine the need for
remedial legislation-whether the harm it is seeking to remedy is
intentional discrimination or incidental discrimination resulting from
seemingly neutral laws.21 When determining a congressional
216 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) (1994) ("laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden
religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise; . . .).
217 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1189 (1997) (quoting Turn-
er Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665-66 (1994)) (stating that Congress 'is far
better equipped than the judiciary to 'amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data'
bearing upon legislative questions."); see also United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 66-
7 (1965) (quoting Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 466 (1943)). The Court in Tot
stated:
[Tihe constitutionality of the legislation depends upon the rationality of the
connection 'between the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed.' The
process of making the determination of rationality is, by its nature, highly
empirical, and in matters not within specialized judicial competence or com-
pletely commonplace, significant weight should be accorded the capacity of
Congress to amass the stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions from it.Id.
218 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) ("Correctly viewed, § 5 is
a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in
determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment."); see also, Flores v. City of Boeme, 73 F.3d 1352, 1359 (1996)
("Congress' constitutional power to legislate pursuant to Section 5 is tied to Congress'
superior ability to find and redress nascent or disguised violations of the Amendment.');
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 577 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Employment Div. Dep't of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
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statute's constitutionality, it is inefficient and, more importantly,
unconstitutional for the Court to attempt to reevaluate congressional
findings of fact.
The principle of judicial restraint is a Court-created concept. A
number of factors have guided the Court towards .the implementa-
tion of the doctrine. The Court has recognized its own inability to
carry out the fact-finding process performed by Congress. It has also
recognized that the members of Congress are bound by the same
oath as the Court to uphold the Constitution. To that end, the Court
has imposed its own limitation on the level of inquiry in which it
may partake when it analyzes the means by which Congress per-
forms its essential function. At all times when the Court analyzes a
congressional statute, the Court must determine what level of defer-
ence to accord to Congress, especially when the Court judges the
constitutionality of a statute. As the Court has explained on more
than one occasion:
Whenever called upon to judge the constitutionality of an Act of
Congress---"the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called
upon to perform,"--the Court accords "great weight to the decisions of
Congress." The Congress is a coequal branch of government whose
Members take the same oath we do to uphold the Constitution of the
United States. . . . [Wile must have "due regard to the fact that this Court
is not exercising a primary judgment but is sitting in judgment upon those
who also have taken the oath to observe the Constitution and who have
the responsibility for carrying on government."
21 9
Ironically, the same Court that decided Boerne (and the same
justice who wrote the Boerne majority decision) acknowledged the
required deference to Congress in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. FCC,220 a case involving the constitutionality of the must-carry
provision of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992.221 The Court described its role with re-
spect to that of Congress:
In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, courts must accord substan-
tial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress. Our sole obliga-
tion is to assure that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn
reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence .... We owe
Congress' findings deference in part because the institution is far better
equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of
219 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (citations omitted).
117 S.c. 5 1174 (1997).
2 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1994).
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data bearing upon legislative questions .... We owe Congress' findings
an additional measure of deference out of respect for its authority to exer-
cise the legislative power.222
As Justice Kennedy, himself, suggested, the Court may not sit as
a legislative body and weigh the evidence before Congress when
Congress enacts legislation. Yet, in Boerne the Court ignored its
own precedent by refusing to accord the required deference to
Congress. Although the Court briefly mentioned that it should defer
to Congress' function as a legislature, 23 it also concluded that
such deference was not required in Boerne.224 The Court did not
contend that remedial measures are never appropriate but rather, as-
serted that "there must be a congruence between the means used
and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of remedial mea-
sures must be considered in light of the evil presented."225 In de-
termining whether RFRA was an appropriate remedial measure, the
Court engaged in a comparison between RFRA and the Voting
Rights Act and carefully scrutinized the evidence presented to
Congress when it enacted RFRA. The Court determined, based on
its own analysis of this evidence, that "[tihe history of persecution in
this country detailed in the [RFRA legislative] hearings mentions no
episodes [of religious bigotry] occurring in the past 40 years."226
Based on this determination, the Court concluded that Congress was
222 Turner Broad. Sys., 117 S. Ct. at 1189 (intemal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2170 (1997) (quoting Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207 (1970)) ('Judicial deference, in most cases, is based not on
the state of the legislative record Congress compiles but 'on due regard for the decision
of the body constitutionally appointed to decide.' As a general matter, it is for Congress
to determine the method by which it will reach a decision."); see also, 117 S. Ct. at
2171-72 (When Congress acts within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has notjust the right but the duty to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and
force of the Constitution .... Were it otherwise, we would not afford Congress the
presumption of validity its enactments now enjoy.").
22. The Court decided that it need not adhere to the principle of judicial deference
in Boerne. The Court noted that it is within the province of the judicial branch to inter-
pret the Constitution, 117 S. Ct. at 2172, and when another branch of government acts
contrary to a judicial interpretation (here, RFRA contradicts Smith), the Court will exer-
cise its discretion to strike down that act under the principle of stare decisis. Id. Profes-
sor McConnell argues, however, that this reasoning is insufficient. McConnell, supra note
205, at 187 n.201. He argues that the order in which the two-branches act should not
determine the proper outcome. Id. Under that theory, he argues, RFRA would have been
constitutional if it had been passed before Smith, a result that "does not make much
sense." Id.
225 117 S. Ct. at 2169.
226 Id.
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not justified in enacting RFRA. The Court's own precedent man-
dates, however, that when the Court inquires into the record before
Congress in determining whether remedial legislation is necessary,
the Court may not sit as a legislative body. The Court is "not at
liberty to substitute [its] judgment for the reasonable conclusion of a
legislative body."227 In deciding the constitutionality of a statute,
the Court must "be particularly careful not to substitute [its] judg-
ment of what is desirable for that of Congress, or [its] own evalua-
tion of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative
Branch."228
Congress, analyzing the same hearings as the Court, deter-
mined that "laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious
exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exer-
cise; .... ,,' It was Congress, not the Court, that conducted these
hearings. The members of Congress were present to question wit-
nesses who gave testimony. The members of the Court were not.
The members of Congress were able to engage in debate to weigh
the evidence presented and consider how much weight such evi-
dence should be given. Based on such evidence RFRA was passed
by a unanimous House and a nearly unanimous Senate.23 The
members of the Court also weighed the evidence before Congress,
but the Court's own precedent strongly cautions against such action.
It is logical that Congress would possess the expertise to evaluate its
own hearings while the Court, acting as an observer of those hear-
ings after they were held, would not be in such a position. Supreme
Court precedent prohibiting the Court from encroaching on the
specific functions of Congress23" ' and precedent prohibiting en-
. Turner Broad. Sys., 117 S. Ct. at 1197.
228 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981).
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) (1994).
21 See supra note 97.
23 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-5 (1987) ("Running a prison is an inordi-
nately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of re-
sources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive
branches of government. Prison administration is, moreover, a task that has been com-
mitted to the responsibility of those branches, and separation of powers concerns coun-
sel a policy of judicial restraint."); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (re-
fusing to award damages in a case of racial discrimination among members of the mili-
tary where 'Congress, the constitutionally authorized source of authority over the military
system of justice, has not provided a damage remedy for claims by military personnel
that constitutional rights have been violated by superior officers."); Rostker, 453 U.S. at
64-65 (holding that the registration provisions of the Military Selective Services Act re-
quiring men, but not women, to register for the draft did not violate the Fifth Amend-
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croachment into more general functions supports this conclusion.
The Court has held that deference to the legislature is not limit-
ed to only to some constitutional matters. Deference must always
be observed. The Court must defer to Congress' superior fact-finding
ability even where the most important constitutional guarantees are
at stake:
Even in the realm of First Amendment questions where Congress must
base its conclusions upon substantial evidence, deference must be accord-
ed to its findings as to the harm to be avoided and to the remedial mea-
sures adopted for that end, lest we infringe on traditional legislative
authority to make predictive judgments when enacting nationwide
regulatory policy.232
Not only is this principle based on precedent, it might also be desir-
able from a practical standpoint. Indeed, when First Amendment
rights are at stake, it is an especially relevant time for the Court to
defer to Congress. The events leading up to the Boerne decision
support this conclusion. When Congress enacted RFRA, it was moti-
vated by lengthy testimony about the effects of the Smith decision.
When the Court decided Smith, it might not have been aware of the
devastating effects the decision was going to have on free exercise
rights. Congress was able to discern the true effects of Smith and
was able to make an informed judgment that the decision would
have an adverse effect on the Free Exercise Clause. When rights
guaranteed under the First Amendment are infringed by a decision
of the Supreme Court in which the Court lacked evidence available
to Congress, it is desirable to allow Congress to take steps to protect
those rights.
The Court has established that, despite the required deference
to Congress, the legislature may not blindly enact laws that raise
significant constitutional issues. The Court has also recognized that
where Congress specifically considers the constitutionality of an act,
the customary deference is most appropriate.233 Congress was
wary of the constitutional problems RFRA raised and, therefore,
ment Due Process Clause, in part, because Congress acted pursuant to its "authority
over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court
accorded Congress greater deference.").
232 Turner Broad. Sys., 117 S. Ct. at 1189.
211 See 453 U.S. at 64 ("The customary deference accorded the judgments of Con-gress is certainly appropriate when, as -here, Congress specifically considered the ques-
tion of the Act's constitutionality.").
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considered RFRA's constitutionality before it was enacted." 4 Had
Congress enacted RFRA without consideration of the constitutional
principles which it might be violating, then surely a stronger argu-
ment could be made that the Court was justified in scrutinizing the
method by which Congress determined such remedial legislation
was needed. However, because Congress had carefully considered
RFRA's constitutional implications, and because the Court has rec-
ognized that 'Congress is a coequal branch of government whose
Members take the same oath [as the Court] to uphold the
Constitution of the United States,"2 35 the Court should have
deferred to Congress' findings and justifications for enacting RFRA.
There is a presumption of constitutionality inherent in all analyses
of legislation enacted by Congress where Congress specifically
considers the constitutionality of the legislation it is enacting. When
Congress considers an act's constitutionality, it is acting pursuant to
its oath to uphold the Constitution. Therefore, the Court must defer
to its 'coequal" branch.
Assuming for just a moment that the Court was correct to sug-
gest that the legislative record before Congress when it enacted
RFRA lacked modern examples of religious bigotry, the Court would
still be incorrect in determining that this was a reason to strike
down RFRA. Congress need not justify the enactment of remedial
legislation by proving that the harm to be prevented has recently
occurred. As the Court stated in Turner, "[a] fundamental principle
of legislation is that Congress is under no obligation to wait until
the entire harm occurs but may act to prevent it. Congress is al-
lowed to make a rational prediction of the consequences of inaction
and of the effects of regulation in furthering governmental inter-
ests."236 Thus, where Congress determined that the absence of a
compelling interest test would have a negative impact on the free
exercise of religion, it could have determined that this impact
would occur in the future. That Congress was basing this prediction
on the real effects of the Smith decision when it enacted RFRA
supports its predictive judgment.2 37
2m See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 13 (1993).
235 453 U.S. at 64.
2' Turner Broad. Sys., 117 S. Ct. at 1197.
" See supra Section I.B.
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In Turner, the Court evaluated a congressional determination
that growth in the cable industry was causing harm to broadcasting
and was resulting in the bankruptcy of many broadcasting sta-
tions.23 The Court recognized that congressional findings of fact
could have supported a conclusion opposite that of Congress, but
the Court deferred to Congress, stating that "it was for Congress to
determine the better explanation. [The Court is] not at liberty to
substitute [its] judgment for the reasonable conclusion of a legisla-
tive body." 39 Of course, in Boerne, that is precisely what the
Court did. It determined, based on the record before Congress, that
there had been no instance of religious bigotry in the past forty
years.240 The Court's conclusion depends on the definition of reli-
gious bigotry. After lengthy hearings on the subject, Congress deter-
mined that religious bigotry can result from neutral laws, as surely
as it does from intentionally discriminatory laws.24" ' The Court
however, disagreed, finding that a legislative record that contains
evidence of discrimination based only on laws neutral towards
religion contains no evidence of discrimination at all.242 Such a
determination is discomforting to those who will be affected by the
lack of any real protection provided by the Free Exercise Clause
after Boerne.24 Congress is capable of determining what protec-
tion is needed and when it determines, based on real evidence of
discrimination, that more protection is needed than that granted by
the Supreme Court, the Court should respect that judgment.
The Court may not look at the same information as Congress
and interpret it in a way that substantially differs from the interpre-
tation of Congress. Even assuming the Court was correct to suggest
that RFRA's legislative record did lack modern examples of inten-
tional religious bigotry (at least to the extent that the past forty years
is the period of modern history in which to judge, which of course
it is not244), the Court must realize that Congress was aware of
this, for it was in hearings held before Congress that this informa-
Turner Broad. Sys., 117 S. Ct. at 1197.
239 Id.
240 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2169 (1997).
24, See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) (1994).
242 117 S. Ct. at 2169-70.
243 See, e.g., Di Mari Ricker, Courts Soul-Search in Religious Law Claims, STUDENT
LAWYER, Oct. 1997, at 22-7.
24 See R. Collin Mangrum, The Falling Star of Free Exercise: Free Exercise and Sub-
stantive Due Process Entitlement Claims in City of Boeme v. Flores, 31 CREIGHTON 1.
REv. 693, 713 (1998).
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tion was revealed. The lack of modern instances of intentional
religious bigotry was not enough to dissuade Congress from enact-
ing a statute it believed was a necessity in light of the unintentional,
but equally substantial, burdens on religious freedom that result
from laws neutral toward religion. The Court should not look at the
same information and come to a different conclusion than Congress
based on its own interpretation of that information. It is simply not
the Court's role. As the Court explained in Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services,24 "[the] Court is not free to invalidate Acts of
Congress based upon inferences that [it] may be asked to draw from
[its] personalized reading of the contemporary scene or recent histo-
ry. In judging the constitutionality of the Act, [the Court] may only
look to its terms, to the intent expressed by Members of Congress
who voted its passage, and to the existence or nonexistence of le-
gitimate explanations for its apparent effect." Had the Court ap-
proached its analysis of RFRA with the same principle in mind, it is
not likely that the Court would have found that Congress was irra-
tional in determining that religious freedom required heightened
protection from seemingly neutral laws.
Moreover, although RFRA's legislative record might have indi-
cated a lack of modern instances of intentional religious persecu-
tion, it did reveal that a number of generally applicable laws had
been enacted which had the incidental effect of significantly bur-
dening religion. Such laws, according to Congress, are as much a
threat to the free exercise of religion as laws that intentionally bur-
den religious freedom.246 Congress' conclusion is not a novel one,
nor is it one without support. It has been stated previously by the
Supreme Court on a number of occasions. In Smith, Justice
O'Connor, who concurred with the judgment of Smith, but not with
the decision to strike down the compelling interest test, stated that:
The First Amendment, however, does not distinguish between laws that
are generally applicable and laws that target particular religious practices.
Indeed, few States would be so naive as to enact a law directly prohibit-
ing or burdening a religious practice as such. Our free exercise cases have
all concerned generally applicable laws that had the effect of significantly
burdening a religious practice. If the First Amendment is to have any
vitality, it ought not be construed to cover only the extreme and hypothet-
ical situation in which a State directly targets a religious practice. As we
have noted in a slightly different context, "[s]uch a test has no basis in
245 433 U.S. 425, 484 (1977).
2"6 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2).
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precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment value to the barest
level of minimum scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause already pro-
vides. 247
The abandonment of the compelling interest test was also
sharply criticized by Justice Souter in his concurrence with the judg-
ment in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, where
he urged the Court to reexamine its decision in Smith.248 In his
concurring opinion Justice Souter noted that "[n]eutral, generally
applicable laws, drafted as they are from the perspective of the non-
adherent, have the unavoidable potential of putting the believer to a
choice between God and government."2 49
For the members of Congress, such information was significantjustification to enact RFRA. Constitutionally, that is all that is re-
quired. Congress need not prove that recent events of intentional
discrimination were the motivation for its enactment of remedial
legislation. It was enough that Congress concluded that neutral laws
could also be burdensome to religious freedom.
The Court criticized RFRA not only because its legislative re-
cord lacked modern instances of religious bigotry but also because
the hearings before Congress emphasized laws of general applicabil-
ity that place incidental burdens on religion."' According to the
Court, "[i]t is difficult to maintain that [such laws] are examples of
legislation enacted or enforced due to animus or hostility to the
burdened religious practices or that they indicate some widespread
pattern of religious discrimination in this country.""' Where the
Court's reasoning fails is in assuming that Congress' concern must
be with laws that intentionally burden religious freedom in order for
RFRA to be justified. Not only may Congress justify the enactment
of remedial legislation without evidence of recent instances of reli-
gious bigotry, but Congress also need not show that the harm which
it intends to prevent is the result of intentional discrimination. In
Jones v. City of Lubbock,2 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
247 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
894 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1987), and Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,
727 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
248 508 U.S. 520, 559 (1993).
249 Id. at 577.
o City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2169 (1997).
25 Id.
212 727 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1984).
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lied on Supreme Court precedent when it was presented with an
opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the Voting Rights
Act. In analyzing Congress' authority to enact the section of the
Voting Rights Act in question, the Court stated that Congress may
seek to protect core values of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments through remedial measures that invalidate election
systems that, although constitutionally permissible, have the effect
of debasing the guarantees of those amendments. The Court, relying
on Supreme Court precedent, stated that "[c]ongressional power to
adopt prophylactic measures to vindicate the purposes of the four-
teenth and fifteenth amendments is unquestioned."253 The Court
further stated that when Congress adopts lawful and rational means
to enforce the Constitution, separation of powers doctrine dictates
that the judiciary, rather than Congress, defer." 4 Even in the case
where a court disagrees with the course taken by Congress, the
court must acknowledge the broad nature of congressional power
first set out in McCulloch v. Maryland."'
In Jones, the Court considered the constitutionality of a provi-
sion of the Voting Rights Act that Congress enacted in response to
the fact that minorities continued to suffer from the effects of elec-
toral systems that hinder minorities.5 ' The Court pointed out that
Congress was considering facially neutral legislation which contin-
ued to have the effects of discrimination in voting.5 7 The Court
concluded that, "[w]here Congress, on the basis of a factual investi-
gation, perceives that a facially neutral measure carries forward the
effects of past discrimination, Congress may even enact blanket
prohibitions against such rules."258 When Congress enacted the
legislation in question in Jones, it was motivated by similar factors
as when it enacted RFRA. The only difference is that one statute
deals with racial bigotry while the other deals with religious bigotry.
However, this is a distinction that should have no effect on constitu-
tional analysis. In both cases, Congress sought to protect a constitu-
tional right of paramount importance by protecting citizens from the
discriminatory effects of facially neutral laws.
2" Id. at 373 (citing City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173 (1980); South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966)).
234 Id. at 374.
25S See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
727 F.2d at 374.
2S7 Id. at 375.
2a Id. (citing 383 U.S. at 334).
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To summarize this argument, Congress is more adept at discov-
ering latent discrimination. When Congress made a determination
that latent religious discrimination existed, it was based on rational
conclusions drawn from an abundance of evidence. The Court is
not as proficient as Congress at discovering this type of discrimina-
tion and should not be questioning the soundness of legislative
findings. When Congress concludes that latent discrimination exists
and is as much a threat to people's constitutional rights as discrim-
ination that is intentional, Congress must be allowed the latitude to
fashion a remedy. The Court's own precedent, as well as reason,
mandate this result.
CONCLUSION
There currently exists in the United States a serious threat to
religious freedom. It is the threat of innocent legislation, of seeming-
ly religion-neutral laws, that hinder the practice of religious free-
dom. The threat is greater than the danger that a government will
enact a law targeting a religious group for persecution. Fear of the
latter threat is no longer a realistic concern because modern princi-
ples of religious freedom have taught us to not tolerate such laws.
Religious practitioners are rarely faced with the burden of a law that
is intended to target a religious group for discrimination. However,
religious practitioners frequently face the burdens to religious free-
dom from neutral, generally applicable laws. Without protection
against such laws, the Free Exercise Clause is rendered virtually
meaningless. One cannot help but wonder if the Free Exercise
Clause now exists in name only. Under the Supreme Court's most
recent interpretation of the Clause, it guarantees nothing more than
protection where protection is not needed. It is precisely because
no government would be naive enough to pass a law with discrimi-
natory intent that RFRA is essential in order to give the Free
Exercise Clause substance.
The Supreme Court has failed to guarantee protection under
the Free Exercise Clause. Congress has determined, after properly
exercising its legislative function, that the Free Exercise Clause must
reach generally applicable laws that have the incidental effect of
burdening religion. These two branches, often in conflict, have at
least one thing in common: they are both sworn to uphold the
Constitution. Congress must be allowed to step in and expand the
scope of the Free Exercise Clause as needed, where the Court has
[Vol. 64: 1
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refused to do so. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine and the principle of judicial restraint
mandate this result.
Robert Hoff

